

C-II CHRON

30 July. Brazilian Amb in Havana message that

Raul Castro visit to Moscow may have been
to return excess (heavy, non-guerrilla) arms &
equipment. [Planted by SU?]

4 Aug. ships to Cuba, characteristics of military cargo.
mess to SecDef & CUCS

6 Aug N/E 85/2/62 fully refuted views of numbers; no
points of controversy raised.

17 Aug: refugee reports on SAMs lead to areas being targeted
in flight scheduled this week (reexamination of Aug 5
photos shows possible SA-2 equipment). (first "evidence").

20 Aug: Ships trooploaded could have carried over 10,000.

Cuba has no pressing need for ^{trust} Bloc units; can handle internal
security. Needs specialists, trainers, technicians.

US/B meetings: 1 Aug

[When SA-2's? As of Aug 62: have been introduced into Indonesia; on order by Egypt, Iraq (Iraq has returned them for MIG's?).

stan ^(5? HCB List)

23 Aug ISA paper "Probable military, political & psychological impact of the establishment in Cuba of SAMs or SSMS which could reach the US."

27 Aug: reports of troops. All of sources of this info, however, are second-hand ad, although Cubans desirous of cooperating with US, they have in past been prone to provide the type of info they think we desire or that would encourage the US to provide aid in ousting Castro.

No reliable evidence that Sov Bloc or Chinese troops have arrived or will arrive in near future.

... Cuba no pressing need for Bloc troop units... Furthermore, Bloc would be unlikely to risk the very adverse reactions likely in Latin America should foreign troops be stationed in the Hemisphere.

Cuba serves Bloc purposes very well at present, and
Sovs would not do anything to destroy or reduce its
usefulness. [cost, risk to Sovs]

28 Aug. report from French on Paul Cartier agreement in Moscow;

50 Aug (Collob. with Rosen + McG in appraisal of
offensive weapons possibilities in Cuba for Pres.
Collob.

6 Sept: Collob. with Rosen in finishing intell. backup during
two meetings of the ExComm (?) chaired by Pres. //

/// Collob. with Rosen in preparing paper on pros &
cons of declaration, for Pres.

[Note: lateness of discovery meant blockade alone
could not be adequate, nor ~~that~~ could
threat prevent deployment]

6 Sept: publication of S4-2s.

[What does acquisition of "hard" evidence do for the
evaluation of related "soft" evidence?]

[Note: "soft" evidence strongly influences speed +
nature of interpretation of "hard" evidence.]

X

7 Sept: instructions on dissem. of info about SSYs.

X

8 Sept: (all Amb Emb Paris # 1141 5 Sep.

French views on Sov policy in Cuba.

8 Sept: MIG-21 (60,000 ft interception).

^(10 Sept)
8 Sept: Buzzing of two US aircraft in Florida Straits by MIG-17
may indicate increase in Cuban aggressiveness & plans for
harassment of US patrols.

X

13 Sept: instructions on dissem.

[Apparently Sovs called for "volunteers" as part of "troop
inactivation program" in Lebanon & Syria; 15 Sept for Cuba.]

Col. Roberts, ISA?

X

18 Sept. Le Roy Miza proposes emphasis on "strong possibility" that USSR is at least considering a change in policy in SNIE.

18 Sept: publication of Banes notes

19 Sept. USIB to ask SG to consider use of Finfly.

19 Sept. ^(request) CII/C to Stude: He believes that probably about 4000 Bloc military advisors & technicians are in Cuba but that no combat units as such have arrived or are likely to arrive.

20 Sept: Collab. with George Carroll on special ops paper on dealing with Cuba.

21 Sept ^{(request):} CII/C to CINCPAC Stude Bishop almost certainly undertaken to strengthen the Comm regime against low-staked Cuban fear that US might intervene. . . .

Sovs probably would not use US intervention as
excuse for immediately overrunning Berlin but Sovs
would take advantage of situation, initiate pressures
^{sub. by. sub.} & probes, consisting of heavily increased propaganda,
harassment, recognition of East Germany, and closing of
access routes through East German agency.

[Shows, in effort, SIV/E to CINC. like Thompson?]

X
24 Sept to Rittman

^{let Sen} 24 Sept. (as of 16 Aug:) Cuban pilots, ^{may be} training in IL-28s.

25. Above story questioned ^{by CINC}: how can commit, since no Spanish
used. "Initial message this subject had major impact here
and DIA does not want to add to confusion until basic
message ^{fully} clarified."

26 Sept: report based on Spanish account in Russian. Apparent transmission
error omitted a "no" at beginning of sentence, "Spanish
terminology was noted"

26 Sept: As USIB, McC said he was disturbed by news stories on Cuba — esp. Finney & Baldwin in Sunday NYT. Releases not cleared through DCI channels.

Finfly accepted by SG.

26 Sept

Int Comm in DOD on Cuba:

(Last year, 300 reports produced;
4337 so far this year)

DIA Estimates: CA Div. Chief: Col. Nigra. Lcdr Finney.

DIA CIIC: CA Section Chief Miss Reed; Lt Col Sullivan.

ACS/I Army: Major Peipotts, Capt. Mayhew.

DXI/Navy: Miss Knox

ACS/I AF: Miss Love

NSA: 140 persons processing info on Cuba; 100% increase
in 3 months. (197 authorized: crash recruiting)

27 Sept: Pres visited JWR ; deal analysis of
Castro's announcement of low fishing port
(See K-Koller, Oct 16)

XX

1 Oct	Col. Wright on suspicious areas	tel 77
XX	" " news for record	" 86
4 Oct		

4 Oct C/IC converted Critical Sit Room for Taiwan
Straits / SE Asia Emphasis to Cuban problem :
Additional personnel assigned & plans considered for
24 hour ops.

[M16-210 supplied to Iraq, Egypt, & Indonesia, and
proposals of sale to India. b, readily identifiable.]
[IL-283: Indonesia, UAR]

~~10 Oct~~: memo to SecDef on IL-283: first hand evidence.

To be published 11 Oct.

11 Oct: Estimates Office collab. with V-3 on analysis
of contingency plans on Cuba for presentation to
SecDef & Pres.

E.O. collab. with Canall & Rowen in detailed
analysis of restricted future gov problems in Cuba.

11 Oct. H-28s published by DIA/CIA.

12 Oct US/B meeting on PSALM (after Oct 11 talk, McG-JFK)

15 Oct: Canall directed info on new types of crates seen on
board ships be kept in PSALM.

PSALM lifted about noon on 22 Oct.

22 Oct: Saw Thant in Cuba.

22 Oct: JCS ask DIA to study: a) When does such
decision to build up Cuba militarily.

b) Why was such a decision made, or was such
a decision related to any particular US, Allied ^{or} ~~or~~
action?

C-II CHRON

7 Sept run for record, Capt. Whetton

1645

On 7 Sept, ¹⁶⁴⁵ Gen Quinn told Capt. Whetton there was a possibility that a report would be received in DIA concerning the presence of SSMS in Cuba. ~~Gen Quinn~~ Gen directed Capt. to take whatever steps might be necessary to guarantee in event such a report were received, that it not be published nor disseminated in any manner without the specific approval of Gen. Quinn. Moreover, Capt not to divulge his orders, nor the nature of the reports he was alerted against, to anyone else, including his immediate superior, Col. Hillis. (Critical period for orders till next Tuesday...)

(On 18 Sept, Quinn informed Whetton that Hillis had been given orders relative to the problem and he was relieved of responsibilities)

13 Sept OS/B Spec Session of 13 Sept

(Dep Dir. notes)

13 Sept Exec session of USIB: USIB members had generally agreed that all agencies would:

2. Avoid all publishing of any intelligence on:

1) MRBMs in Cuba

2) The existence of a low base in Cuba.

3) That there are offensive weapons being delivered to Cuba such as SAMs, subs and bombers.

4) Use of Cuba as a transport point for the movement of arms to other Carib. or L.A. countries.

5) Indications of Cuban aggressive actions.

6. Avoid briefing intelligence in all the areas indicated above, except any such intell. may be passed verbally to those key individuals in each department within the military ~~the~~ intelligence chiefs believed had an absolute need to know.

~~(At present)~~ (Restrictions had been imposed in D/4AP-3 informally several days earlier).

18 Sept.

Talking paper by Nigra for O D/A for USIB meeting on

SNIE 85-3-C2 ;

(earlier draft reviewed by USIB on 7 Sept)

no reservations on discussion.

Draft conclusions by C/A do not adequately reflect one basic thrust: i.e. that the Soviets may be considering a change in policy and, in the absence of forceful reaction, may be tempted to introduce more "offensive" weapons in their step-by-step development of mil. exp. in Cuba.

Recommended change:

29-33 But we cannot exclude the strong possibility that the USSR is at least considering a change in policy. (C and D as word? What was C/A version?)

4 Oct John Wright, mem for record

Subject: Suspicious Areas, Cuba

1. Analysis of pattern of confirmed SAM sites reveals two areas in Western Cuba which are defended by SA-2s for no apparent military reason.

[like perturbations from Neptune?]

2. On about 25 or 26 Sept I recommended to Col. Cole & Capt. Grayson, SAO, that next flight cover these areas. Cole & Grayson informed me that there might not be any further high alt. flights due to the apparently operational status of the SA-2s in Cuba. I emphasized the necessity of knowing whether or not the SAs were installing MRBMs in these areas, and they agreed to make every possible effort to secure photo coverage.
3. With the possibility of no ^{approved} more flights, (got all available info from CIA on suspect areas; on 3 Oct, Lt. Col. ^{A.C.} Davies briefed him; agreed to look into possibility of targeting agents into these areas, but noted that the ultra stringent security measures currently in effect in Cuba did not indicate a high degree of success.

Nov 7 CIA Handling of the Saw Building in Cuba

Diet Lehman

Bill Tidwell : Hitchcock deputy. (Boy of Pigs : Miami)

Hitchcock
call { Cynthia Krabo N/C
Frank Denny Dir. N/C (Crisis since 1960)

Tom Parrott (Special Activities : Cuba).

Jack Smith (Admirer : must be cover name.

(Chris Deputy) John; "Gomer?" (Still?))

John Huzinga : Board NE member for Saw.

Villard Mathias

Mathias : Trends in the World Situation

Feb¹⁹ 1964

Walt Elden : Exec Asst. for MCC

[Bruce Clark, Col. Mil Dir OCI on NSA item on U-2

Special Group (Argentinian) meant RFEK included - for
Cuba, since plan for intell. buildup Dec 61 - Jan 62.

Tischmiller briefed RFEK on SAM photos on Aug 30; ~~these~~^{US}
all RFEK was interested in was, "Can they reach ~~into~~?"

"No; but there must be at least 2500 Sov troops;
this means a big Sov commitment, a Sov base ..."

RFEK couldn't be interested in anything but whether
they were a threat to US."

See June 4, 1964 Reporter editorial on foreigners
playing with US elections.

New Republic
Jean Daniel piece Unofficial Enemy, Dec. 14, 1963

+ Dec 7, 1963

("intimate enemy in the White House" with
to Castro,
whom, K said, "it was possible to talk.")

"that partner^(JFK) with whom he had as strong a desire
to ~~to battle~~ confer as to do battle."

1) Burg: 3 Brit intell descriptions: ship, transfer, London
French Secret Service

2) SAC accidental route Oct 14

3) Wide dist. of state photos on II-28's (centrality of week)
(interp. by some who didn't know of restriction).

4)

6) See SC will take

1 June 64

~~It is~~ (Moscow might soon announce reduction of 20,000 troops from East Germany).

... It is unlikely that (K) contemplates any steps at this time which might provoke a Berlin crisis.

[Or: is he accompanying a "treaty of friendship" with East while disarming West of incentive for buildup?]

see Kaag (Danish Prime Min) statement to Johnson

... ~~The~~ On several occasions in the past six months they have stated that they expect no progress on major East-West issues before US elections.

K. however, may have decided that new initiatives at this time would be useful not only in conveying a sense of motion in the USSR's German policy but also in preparing the ground for substantive talks after the
US
~~the~~ elections.

[OK: Count on US not to resist moves before elections; confront it with "hopeless" situation after.
Even do Cuba right this time. 7

Special Cuba Task Group

Caribbean Admission Center (CIA)

7. Aug: (Low-lat troops would all but preclude mass defections from Army & militia; this would prevent O-Day buildup of ^{sig. body of} insurgents. Resultant potent Cuban low military force could be effectively opposed only in kind. It is believed that a previous reference by high-ranking Cuban naval officials that "danger to Cuba would be over by Sept. 62" was related to this influx of low-lat military support.

17 Aug memo forwarded, John Wright

(Prelim. analysis of recent refugee reports from CAC indicates that SA-2 missiles may have been introduced into Cuba between 30 July and 5 Aug, together with large numbers of low military technicians. Although reports uncorroborated, sufficient descriptive detail to warrant further checking.

On Aug 15, writer discussed the available tenuous evidence with Col. Gale & Capt Grayson; requested 3 specific areas for coverage in next recon flight.

over

Cole accepted: [†]would ask NPIC to reexamine most recent photos in these areas.

On 17 Aug, at 1645Z, Lt. showed me photos taken on 5 Aug: revealed concentrations of military equipment which P/B identified as possibly SA-2 missiles on trailers & assoc. equip. (in 2 of the 3 areas; Bases covered by clouds).

High alt flight scheduled for this week: areas will be included. [didn't fly till Aug 29]

27 Aug: C/IC briefing.

In view of Cuban concern over US overflights and apparent influx of Sov mil. & civ. technicians, appearance of SA-2 missile would not be surprising. There is at this time, however, no hard evidence that such a missile has arrived in Cuba.

(see earlier notes)

— TDCS, official French Service, info given 11 Aug, Paris
 acquired 15 Aug, dist. 16 Aug.

In high military circles it has been commented that
 Raul Castro, in his visit to the SU, did not obtain his
 objective, i.e. that Cuba be admitted into the Warsaw Pact.
 However, as Minister of the Armed Forces & Dep. Prime Min.
 he did sign an agreement allowing the Soviets "free
 use of Cuban territory for handling any matter military
 or otherwise as they saw fit, not having to give any
 account of their acts to the Cuban government."

2. The Soviets are supposed to send into Cuba two
divisions from the Armies of the Sov. Bloc.

3. Some are of opinion that USSR plans to do in Cuba
 what she did in Spanish Civil War — experiment with
 new materials & armaments, techniques, military tactics, etc.

28 Aug: DIA eval, Capt. Stahl

DIA has no info to confirm, and considers it improbable

that Castro would be willing give anyone "free use of Cuban territory," in view of his megomania. [Out-fear?]

There does not appear to be any internal need for Sov or Bloc military units in Cuba and the idea that the Sovs would send 2 divisions is considered highly unlikely.

There is no similarity between the situation in Cuba & that in Spain and it is not believed that the Sovs would be willing to run the risk of hostilities with the US by sending military units to Cuba for testing material or tactics.

(to DCI)

29 Aug D/S

deliberations suggest USSR has made a policy decision to bolster rapidly Cuba's military defense system — possibly including SA-2's — despite the possibility that this could result in a further deterioration in US-Sov relations.

C-II CTRON

16 Oct. JCS 1630-1845

1. Selection MRBM strike dangerous; air attack on MRBMs + MIGs only, unsound, as US should strike air bases, air defenses and SAMs to eliminate the total threat. (Also, tanks and all other signif. military targets — those which can affect US or its forces. The objectives, to eliminate threat to US and liberate Cuba. [Why this dropped?] [escalation? allies?]

air strike + blockade: acceptable.

See airborne alert + dispersal.

17 Oct. 0930-1620. Discussed possible Sov reactions:

pressure on US (Berlin, Quemoy, Form, Turkey, Korea): most likely Berlin. Most likely Sov reactions at sea, w. Iran^(?), or by an ICBM "accident" on Pacific Test Site (Johnston Island) [?] and that sharp & strong emergency actions at Berlin, short of seizure, could reasonably be expected

Memo for SecDef, JCS confirmed views presented orally

16 Oct: air attack on all military targets, + blockade; opposing strike w. IRBMs alone; elim. of Castro would require invasion.

16 Oct: Air Strike (MRBMs?) could be initiated 24 hrs
after approval; big air strike + invasion, 16 days.

18 Oct: earliest feasible date for air strike, 21 Oct;
option 23 Oct; earliest for invasion, 28 Oct.

19 Oct: presented to Pres at 1000 hours: only satisfactory
solution to the Cuban problem from the military point of
view was surprise attack on comprehensive targets,
recon, complete blockade, & ultimate invasion.
Recognized, a strain on alliances & problems with Berlin.

20 Oct: 1000-1406. Talking Paper for JCS for afternoon
WH meeting. (done)

approved:

[see: drafts by Bundy: Air Strike within (19 Oct);
possible WH statement (22 Oct), announcement (23 Oct),
Pres speech (23 Oct)]

18/5: informed of decision, CNO to represent JCS (blockade).

JCS to be prepared to: Execute strike against missiles only:
a) without warning 22 or 23 Oct; b) after 24 hrs notice; 2) execute ^{air strike} _{missile strike}

3) Pass to GW.

Decided: SAC alert aircraft would be round from

Δ

John Whitman

Bill Highland

W Fitchcock

Tidwell

x

7

US: 31 Oct: (when requested? 27 Oct?)

Admiral SecDef: That in event of a Sov attack on Jupiter in Turkey.

with HE, 6 alternatives available that didn't involve

US use of nukes: 2) NATO air attacks with conv.

wpns on selected military targets in satellites;

b) same, for USSR; c) Destruction of Sov subs on high seas;

d) Sub warfare on all Bloc shipping & naval bases;

e) Seizure of Bloc shipping as opportunity presented;

f). With NATO allies, closing Bosphorus, Dardanelles, &

Danish Straits to Bloc shipping.

Also effective: delayed impact measures: increasing

US defenses in Europe & Med & closing Panama Canal.

NATO strategy was based on principle that
Painted out: any Sov. Bloc attack on a NATO country

would call for immediate military retal. by NATO;

therefore, a Sov attack on Jupiter under circumstances
given (?) highly improbable.

[Side judgment on Sov putting missiles in Cuba!]

Use of offer


8 in Louitges: pushed for their conventional cap. (State, Army)
But Baldwin stories.

Paine concept on Puring

Her reluctance on ones. Felt not informed of final thought on ones.

Johnson: JCS attempt to write a Treaty with Pres (class)

Fl... if he will guarantee that if... he will...



20 Oct Never "hard" evidence on our workbooks.

Our first "hard" evidence was discovery of "likely" one weapons storage bunker.

(Suppose earlier reluctance to predict mines had persisted, and some standards of "hardness.")

Why a conviction on 27 Oct that decision on air attack must be soon?

(What was impact on us of U-2 overflight, firings...?)

(What would we have done about further shootdowns?)

When/how did SecDef/Excomm learn of or participate in decisions
(1200, 22 Oct)
on SAC airborne alert, dispersal, CINCPAC dispersal,
DEFCON 2 (1900, 24 Oct)
SAC force generation? (When did SAC actually begin generation?
What standard?)
What was SU response between 12 and 7, 22 Oct?

Chronology

5 Aug: recon showed no signif. military buildup.

31 Aug: ^{possible MIGs} SA-2 sites: first signif. developments in Cuban military postures.

see Daily Int. Surv (DIS) of Sept 6 ("defensive")

5 Sept: first proof of MIG-21s.

4 Oct: DIA established Cuban Int. Room 24 hr basis

— 10 Oct: DIA received Navy Photo Inter. Center report of
photos of 28 Sept. on probable IL-28 crates.

[Overall defensive picture. What did JCS believe?]

JCS meeting 1400-1710 on 15 Oct: possible ops against Cuba.

[Did they know yet? Had they already concluded...?]

What of earlier SecDef requests for plans?]

now believed to number about 16,000.

↑ 50 personnel:

6 Oct: believed 5-6000.

19 Oct: not less than 8-9000 specialists.

27 Oct: photos of 25 Oct showed camp, ^{at Remedios} FROGS, tanks.

8 Nov: 6 Nov. photos showed more FROGS, etc at Remedios

4 Sov armor battalions believed in Cuba.

7 Nov: Sov personnel with SAMs 3900

cruise missiles 500

at least 1230 troops for defense of missiles:

scrapper anti-tank, Frog ⁽¹⁰⁰⁾, 4 tank battalions (each with
31 T-54 tanks
and 250 mm)

10 Nov DIS on Cuban/Sov forces.

12 Nov: photos of 10 Nov showed air-to-air missiles for Mig-21's.

photos of 9 Nov suggested that the 4 Sov units were
composite around or much. groupings of over regimental strength

23. Airmen evidence indicated greater strength: groupings had
total of well over 4000 troops (rather than 900-1200).

16 Nov. Recommended to Pres on 16 Nov; IL-28's removed, pref. by negotiation,
otherwise blockade and, if and by, by air action; that US make withdrawal of

20 Oct, after 1800: decided SAC alert air. could be moved from
unusable bases beginning 22 Oct.

21 Oct: authorization should be obtained from SecDef

to disperse CONAD fighters and SAC B-47s the
afternoon of 22 Oct.

"To recommend (to whom?) that SAC initiate
force generation, CONAD execute planned dispersal of
non-armed interceptors, and SAC implement partial air alert.

(whom?)

22: CJCS was to inform SACEUR of developments.

US forces to go to increased alert (?) at P-Base,
except for EUCOM. (?) 2300, 22 Oct. USCINCEUR
to use his discretion in complying with directives in light
of warning order of 21 Oct. (?)

SAC would initiate, quietly & gradually, partial a.a.
beginning 1200, 22 Oct;

SAC, at its discretion (?) implement B-47 dispersal
beginning 1200, 22 Oct. CONAD likewise, on quiet basis.

Subject to SecDef approval, SAC generation beginning 1200,
22 Oct to max at 1200, 23 Oct.

(SecDef knew? Approved?)

Letter from K, 23 Oct.

Answer by JFK, 23 Oct.

Letter by K, 24 Oct

Answer by JFK, 25 Oct.

Letter by K 26 Oct.

Public letter by K, 27 Oct.

Ans. by JFK, 27 Oct.

24 Oct: K: Sov vessels would not be instructed to submit to guarantees, and should US forces "violate" international laws of navigation, USSR would take the measures deemed necessary.

[When did ship draw back?]


25 Oct: report of drawback.

JFK answer: SU had made first challenge, US had responded. Hoping Sov would take action necessary to restore pre-crisis sit.

24 Oct. K: ships would not observe.

25 Oct. 3 ^{suspected missile carriers} SU ships, reportedly changing course; all SU
dry cargo ships seemed to be pulled back from
quarantine line.

26 Oct. 3 Sov ships now steaming east, and all but
one dry cargo ships.



Sat:

27 Oct: No evidence of ~~loss~~ intent to halt construction;
5 sites open, 6th by 28 Oct.

Photos of 25 Oct confirmed presence of FROGS,
tanks, armored vehicles, in a camp.

A U-2 over Cuba reported overdue,
(when?) then missing & crashed down. ~~Loss~~ Plane's location
unknown, & whether loss had resulted from hostile action.
Subsequent Cuban reports of recovery of wreckage & pilot's
body established location, but Castro never explicitly
acknowledged shooting down.

JCS recommended air strikes no later than 29 Oct
unless irrefutable evidence of dismantling obtained in
meantime.

Loss of U-2 discussed by JCS with SecDef in light
of action decided on 23 Oct in event of such happening.
(inform Pres. through SAC/DOD channels; ^{prob.} recommend immediate
^{most} retaliation against the ^{most} likely SAM, and prob. continue U-2).
In view of absence of any facts regarding cause of loss, decided
no action pending receipt of more info.

28 Oct 0900-1400 JCS meeting:

In view of recent intell. on Sov equip. in Cuba, request recommendation from CINCLANT on any changes necessary in his planning, particularly whether US invasion forces should be equipped with tac nuc. CANT replied: considered it prudent that US air & ground forces earmarked for Cuba have on atomic delivery cap. So JCS authorized him to take nuclear capable delivery systems (e.g., 8" how, Honest John) but no nuc weapons themselves without further JCS approval.

Intending to schedule 4 low-level recon flights for late afternoon, & that aircraft would fly through any fire encountered. (?) (disapproved? no flights)

Draw attention of CINCS to lateral K message, which JCS thought might be an insincere proposal intended to gain time.

Again considered loss of 0-2; no action.

Alex A+L Foreign Cars 548-8443

3500 Jeff Davis

R+S Import Motors Sinclair Station, Wash + Lee

Shopping Center, 123 S. Wayne Ave.

527-9627

Col. Kimbrell

53185

Adm. Ross NASA

13-24466

Weiss

last low flights: 15 Nov

30-31 more;

29 Oct: Continuing analysis of 27 Oct showed continuing construction & concealment. Camouflage & concealment were becoming more effective.

see OIS: K's 28 Oct message... appeared to be an attempt to ward off any contemplated US action that might destroy the bases. No proof ["hard"?] that the Sars had begun dismantling missile sites or IL-28s. Latest photos, taken prior to Sar statement, showed construction proceeding rapidly.

(no flights)

30 Oct: No evidence in 29 Oct low-level photos that Sars were dismantling or vacating any of offensive missile sites. On the contrary, construction of prod. storage bunkers & concealment activities were continuing.

no flights

31 Oct: Available evidence still did not indicate Sar preparations for dismantling or vacating the sites. Although many missile erectors had been removed from their hardstands, this not believed to have had any effect on their full oper. cap.

DIA told Dep Sec Def: after company photos of 27-29 Oct:

No evidence of dismantling; evidence of additional construction as well as of extensive concealment.

Friday

2 Nov: from low-level photos of 1 Nov: Sows were abandoning,

30 Oct

US waited in negotiations... right of US to surveillance, without interference, so long as US guaranteed in any way the non-invasion of Cuba.

Still mentioned only offensive negotiations.

6 Nov: see next page

15 Nov: last low-level. Castro letter to US that was going to fire on US recon aircraft. [When does he take over SAMs?

16 Nov JCS: recommend low-level flights for 17 Nov: on it most

fully defended targets, ready fighter escort missions.

Advise Pres that Armed Forces were at optimum posture to execute both air strikes & invasion. Could maintain for 30 days.

[Disappointed? No low-level after 15th] ~~lower~~

Alt. is not absence of influence of OSD; but absence of
info on consequences; national objectives, perspective (C+C)

Simplicity is essential, but...

Planning for alternatives ~~is~~ my fail, but lack of
planning, or one-option planning...

Simple models; strategies; single factors; dichotomies.

Kahn: need for reason. ^a Faith?

But: 1) heuristic process; innovation, etc.

C+C
Controlled response
but, etc.

2) like candle, reveals darkness to us, the
size + unfamiliarity of the room

~~Differs between~~

8 Nov: recommend to Sec Def: US reaction to a hostile attack on US recon. aircraft be:

a) Protest to USSR info at UN and within:

b) Full attack on all airfields & air defense weapons systems in Cuba, & consideration of additional measures, if act ^{hostile} judged part of deliberate program of resistance to surveillance;

or c) If act judged isolated incident, limited retali. action, preferably against responsible site.

9 Nov: JCS concern with ISA paper "Long Term Surveillance Requirements": complete high-level coverage every 30 day + low-level flights or on-site inspection of suspicious locations; sufficient low-level flights to protect the "right" to such flights whether or not suspicious activities were located; & stopping surveillance.

OK:

18 Nov: Cubans couldn't interfere with U-2, little with low-level. (?)

19 Nov: in view of high-level decision against low-level flights on 19-20 Nov, to recommend only U-2 for 20 Nov.; reaffirm views on US reaction to hostile acts (7 Nov)

20 Nov: Rules of Engagement for fighter support of low recon. ^{Operational} ~~ethical~~: recon to

6. Attitudes toward style + change + influence:

Blackett; Rapoport; ~~White~~ Blacking; White;
Newman.

7. Difference between public notions and classified work

(Kahn; Schelling, AWW).

rational wing
not: computing, math, game theory.

Difference between then + now.

8. Analysis continues. Is this a good thing? Are we glad?

Iron type

Kane: (losing sides)

9. Real problems of data: e.g. Bomb damage

Good + bad analyses; simplicity, distortion of the best of them.

Failures of prediction with best: R-266.

10. But what are alternatives?

Blackett: but, conflict of ~~the~~ "wisdom," uncertainty.

Still relevance of experience, tacit knowledge.

Kane. NO. Alternative is not "knowledge," free
& examination guess hypothesis, theory; full complexity of reality.

[Were low-level flights ever started again?

Note: determine based on Castro threats.

(No longer relief flights needed? Attitude on
"incidents"? Controversy?)

Combined (like Sept 4) with Pres statement on 20 Nov,
again continued.

1. McN's Magic Word

Demands for: ~~consider~~ answers in form of:
You'd Want to know

2. Why ask why? What are the consequences?

3. Authority, power. Info; opening up VCS; exposing conflict,
lack of analysis, evidence for generals.

Spend; inability to answer; rationale for reorg.

Control of VCS activity

4. ~~Adverse~~ Influence of systems analysts in OSD and Services.

Their Style: op analysis applied to large, systems questions
of R+D, procurement, posture, plans.

Their limitations Personal style (+ McN's)

Force for

5) Change, innovation, revolution: budgeting, policy objectives,
plans, force levels,

Reorg Act of '58; new role of VCS; JMWGA, VCCRG, JSSG; Program Packages